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NSC BRIEFING 30 December 1953

BACKGROUND

Iranian Oil Production

I. Annual production prior to nationalization

(21 March 51) - about 33,000,000 tons of crude/year (242 million barrels in 1950 last year full production)--about 80 percent was refined, mostly exported; about 20 percent was crude, mostly exported

II. Total production since nationalization:

Probably about 2,500,000 tons -- exported about 135,000 tons, mostly crude; domestic sales about 2,000,000 tons.

III. Oil revenues produced 12 percent of Iran's budget and 30 percent of country's total income.

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IV. After a settlement is reached, Iranian production will resume slowly and will probably not reach full capacity for three years. Oil experts believe that slowly rising Iranian production can be accommodated on world markets with only small cutbacks elsewhere.

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VSC BRIEFING

30 December 1953

BACKGROUND

New Iranian elections

I. Elections for a new Majlis and Senate

will be held before end of January.

A. Government intends elections will be held simultaneously in all districts and be completed within a 24-hour period, with Majlis and Senate elections on separate days.

B. This would contrast with customary procedure where elections have dragged on for months.

1. Elections to last Majlis were never completed.

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2. After 81 out of 136 deputies had been chosen, Mossadeq government suspended elections in 30 districts where vote was going against its supporters.

III. Of 136 Majlis deputies to be elected, 12 are from Tehran and 124 from provincial districts.

- A. Deputies need not reside in districts which elect them.
- B. Each deputy is elected for two years; term dates from day three-fourths of deputies are in Tehran.
- C. Simple majority (69 deputies) constitutes a quorum.

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

III. Senate has 60 members; regular term is  
six years.

A. Half of Senate is elected; other half  
appointed by shah.

B. Half of the Senators elected and half  
of those appointed must be from  
Tehran; remainder must come from  
provinces.

C. Senators must be residents of  
districts from which they are  
appointed or elected.

IV. Population of Iran is estimated at  
18 million. Tehran's population is  
estimated at 850,000.

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NSC BRIEFING

30 December 1953

BACKGROUND

Sidelights

- I. Iranian electoral law on Majlis candidates:  
"Candidates must be completely honest by reputation."
- II. More than 3,000 candidates are anticipated to file for the 136 seats.
- II. New Tudeh slogan at time of arrival of British chargé: "Charge d'affaires go home!"
- IV. Between the time of Zahedi's assumption of power and 13 November, reports show that 3,000 Tudeh and pro-Mossadeq sympathizers had been arrested. Of these about half appear to have been released.

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V. Many of those arrested have been exiled without trial to prisons in Luristan in west-central Iran and to the Persian Gulf island of Khark. Facilities at these two places were strained by the sudden influx of prisoners and strenuous efforts are being made to build the necessary quarters and requisition supplies.

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NSC BRIEFING 30 December 1953

BACKGROUND  
THE SITUATION IN IRAN

Status of Communist penetration of Iranian  
military establishments

- I. In April 1953 a commission of high-ranking Iranian officers estimated 1,600 Tudeh members in armed forces, 900 in the Army, 300 in the Air Force and 200 each in the Military College and Military High School.
- II. Iranian army intelligence has long shown awareness of Tudeh activity in army and is familiar with Tudeh army officers organization and has identified various individuals involved.
- III. Iranian G-2, Colonel Pakravan, has been in charge of ferreting out Tudeh in the Army. Several hundred army officers, non-coms and soldiers have been arrested.

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In G-2's office four officers out of a total of sixty, and 20 non-coms out of a total of 25 to 30 have been removed for suspected Tudeh sympathies. Of those arrested around 250 non-commissioned officers have reportedly been summarily dismissed from the service after their arrest, others have been exiled. At least sixty officers who were under arrest presented a problem because the documentary proof of their complicity in the Tudeh party was "mysteriously missing" from G-2 files.

IV. Attention was drawn particularly to Tudeh infiltration of the Air Force on 22 September when Communist sympathizers succeeded in temporarily sabotaging 13 planes.

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V. The Iranian Chief of Staff, in October,

asked the [REDACTED]

25X1X

25X1X [REDACTED] for a list of Communists

25X1X known by [REDACTED] to be in the Iranian army. He said that he could not locate his own list.

VI. In early November 1953 Iranian G-2 remarked that only a small proportion of Party members or sympathizers in the army have been known or apprehended.

In later statements he has been more optimistic, although there is no convincing evidence that the situation has changed markedly.

VII. It probably is true that current Iranian army efforts to remove Communist sympathizers are more widespread and more successful than during Mossadeq's regime.

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However, the army has neither the  
knowledge, the experience, nor the  
organization to do an effective job.

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